France

Current situation

With the end of conscription in 1997, France introduced into the secondary school an obligatory “day of preparation for national defence”, subsequently renamed “day of defence and citizenship”, the primary purpose of which was to introduce pupils to the armed forces and to encourage them to think about military enlistment. This continues; failure to attend means ineligibility for the baccalaureat at the end of education; there is no provision for conscientious objection.

During the presidential campaign of 2017, a new element emerged when Emmanuel Macron as candidate proposed the re-establishment of a national service in the armed forces and the gendarmerie, which would create against a time of crisis a “mobilisation reservoir supplementary to the National Guard.” This was subsequently elaborated as a Service National Universel or SNU (Universal National Service) which would be obligatory for all young people, male and female, between the ages of 15 and 17.

In 2019, the first 2,000 volunteers in thirteen departments took part in the pilot for the first part of the scheme, a sejour de cohesion (summer camp) of twelve days spent in uniform, and featuring activities such as daily raising of the flag, singing of the Marsellaise and parade ground drills. The second part is a placement of not less than 84 hours of service in the public interest, including in voluntary organisations, the police, the gendarmerie, the fire service, civil defence and the armed forces; a third, apparently non-obligatory, element is a period of six to twelve months paid service to be undertaken between the ages of 18 and 25 in the same areas. Some of this, for example “civil service” caring for the disabled, would incorporate voluntary programmes which are already in existence; others would where relevant entail becoming a full member of the armed forces, albeit on a temporary basis.

COVID caused the cancellation of the programme planned for 2020, however in 2021, 14,650 young people took part, a number rising to 32,000 in 2022 and 60,000 in 2023, still however only a fraction of the 800,000 or so per annum who would be involved were it to become compulsory.

At one stage, there was talk of making the scheme compulsory from 2024, but widespread opposition and legal and logistical problems have delayed this.

The Collective “NON au SNU” REF was founded on 24th May 2019 bringing together some forty associations, trade unions, political parties, youth movements, neighbourhood groups etc. It denounced the SNU as representing the repression of youth, a threat to workers rights, a waste of money and a reinforcement of militarisation. Another initiative, Jeunesses Citoyennéte Emancipation^[1] was founded in advance of the 2022 elections by a number of educational, human rights and youth groups to promote an alternative programme for youth, crucially without the obligatory and military aspects of the SNU. Meanwhile, a Senate committee which reported on 8th March 2023^[2] pointed out the logistical difficulties and enormous cost of “generalising” the scheme; the latest suggestion, by Prime Minister Gabriel Attal on 30th January 2024 is therefore that this will take place with effect from the beginning of the 2026 academic year.^[3] (Liberation, 30th January) Another aspect which the voluntary pilot schemes do not address was the likelihood of a high refusal rate in an obligatory programme. It is not yet clear what the consequences of refusal will be.

Because of the target age range, the SNU cannot be defined as military service. Nevertheless somehow it aspires to use its link with national defence and the military to evade the International Labour Office’s definition of forced labour, embodied in Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights, to which the only permitted exceptions are work performed as part of a penal sentence or military service (including alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors).

Meanwhile, it undeniably represents a reimposition of a form of conscription, and given the overtly militaristic nature of the concept, and many of the actual placements, some provision for conscientious objection would clearly be appropriate; the fact that civilian options are available is an unfortunate muddying of the issue; it does not render service in military units truly voluntary.

EBCO will continue to watch with concern the development of the scheme, particularly the manner in which its erosion of the distinction between military and civilian service operates to sideline and weaken the right of conscientious objection to military service.